World Citizens on the Periphery: Threat and Identification with Global Society[1]

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Who identifies as a world citizen? Many scholars argue that transnational connections are the primary conduits for global cultural diffusion and, therefore, that affluent residents of the densely connected global core should be the most likely to identify with global society. However, empirical studies have shown that global identification is common on the global periphery. The authors build on theories suggesting that individuals may emphasize expansive identities when particularistic identities fail to provide a sense of security in the face of threat. They argue that members of peripheral and marginalized groups express greater global identification because of the threat inherent in their precarious social positions. The authors show that (1) global identification is more common among residents of weaker and more repressive states, (2) members of repressed minority groups are more likely to identify with global society than conationals with collective access to state power, and (3) many residents of one weak state—Lebanon—expressed greater enthusiasm for global connection immediately following a terrorist attack.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long theorized that global social, economic, and institutional interconnectedness will increasingly prompt individuals to call local "iden-

[1] The authors are listed in alphabetical order; each contributed equally. We thank Akram Al-Turk, Victor Asal, Lisa Baranik, Bart Bonikowski, Robert Braun, John Boli, Jonathan Horowitz, Amaney Jamal, Ali Kadivar, Charles Kurzman, Richard Lachmann, Joscha Legewie, Aliza Luft, Ijlal Naqvi, Laura Nelson, David Rigby, Michael Robbins,

0002-9602/2018/12403-0003$10.00

tities and loyalties into question for their narrow particularism" and identify as members of "humanity as a whole" or as "world citizens" (Boli 2005, pp. 386, 391; see also Kant 1796). Consequently, we might expect that elites with extensive transnational connections would be most likely to identify with the global order (e.g., Calhoun 2012; Canclini 2014). Empirical work, however, has demonstrated that many members of some of the most isolated and marginalized groups express universalistic, global identities (Pichler 2011; Bayram 2014). If global identification follows from international connections, how can we explain the prevalence of global identification on the periphery?

We theorize that members of peripheral groups identify with global society not because they are persistently "*pulled* in the direction of the global" by shared network ties (Carruthers and Halliday 2006, p. 573; emphasis added), but rather because adverse local conditions push them toward universalistic, global identities. To develop this claim, we draw on recent work in social psychology that understands expressions of collective identity as part of a search for "personal security and psychological stability" through solidarity with powerful groups (Wimmer 2013*a*, p. 5; 2013*b*, p. 172). This scholarship suggests that threat—a perception that something aversive is going to happen to oneself as an individual or one's social collectivity—motivates people to emphasize the most powerful identity that they can legitimately claim (e.g., Abascal 2015). Given that international organizations and advocacy networks have increasingly provided threatened groups with potential global allies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tsutsui 2006), we argue that the most powerful identity available to many peripheral groups may be as members of global society. This stands in sharp contrast to more securely positioned groups, whose members can find security in particularistic identities. Thus, we argue that threat prompts individuals to search for security through collective identification, but where this search leads varies by social position, pulling members of relatively powerful groups into particularistic identities but pushing peripheral groups toward more universalist and global identities.

Three complementary sets of analyses support our claims. First, using two cross-national attitude surveys merged with data on state capacity, we demonstrate that residents of weak and repressive states are more likely to identify as "world citizens." Second, using data on the social positions of groups within countries, we show that members of neglected and marginal-

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ized groups are more likely to express global identities than more securely positioned conationals. Third, we leverage survey data collected before and after a terrorist attack in Lebanon—a state that is generally unable to guarantee physical security to its residents—to evaluate how an acute or sudden increase in threat affects global identification in weak states. We find that residents of Mount Lebanon, a governorate whose leaders have historically appealed to the international community to establish security, express greater enthusiasm for global connection in the wake of the attack. In contrast, residents of South Lebanon, a governorate with a history of conflict with global actors, express less enthusiasm for global connection and greater support for local security institutions.

GLOBAL CONNECTION AND GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION

During the past century, the globe has become increasingly connected through the growth of transnational institutions, advances in communication technology, and the expansion of global trade and migration. For example, the number of intergovernmental organizations increased from 27 to 354 between 1900 and 2005 (Beckfield 2003; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), there were more than 25,000 active international nongovernmental organizations in 2016 (Union of International Associations 2016, p. 26; see also Hughes et al. 2009; Paxton, Hughes, and Reith 2015), and global trade expanded more than 80-fold between 1900 and 2014 (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2017). In 2015, global mobile phone use reached 96% and internet use exceeded 40% (World Bank 2015). Even people living in isolated peripheral communities are often able to access global networks through personal and community resources (Zayani 2015).

Some argue that even actors who resist inclusion in a world society fostered by these connections are unceasingly "pulled in the direction of the global" (Carruthers and Halliday 2006, p. 573) as transnational interactions reify world society as a "real entity" around which to construct identities (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Saito 2011). Consequently, individuals may reject local identities and identify as "world citizens" (Boli 2005, pp. 386, 391), a shift that potentially spells "the end of the 'global other'" (Beck 2011, p. 1348; see also Sassen 2001; Abizadeh 2005; Canclini 2014). International organizations facilitate this process by spreading a set of "global" norms including democracy, secularism, rationality, environmentalism, science promotion, racial and religious tolerance, women's rights, and human rights (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997). This, some argue, produces a singular global culture, which effectively "homogeniz[es] the life experience, outlook, and intentions of individuals everywhere" (Boli 2005, p. 388) who "most avidly sacrifice their traditional cultural identities and adopt models reflecting standard global values" with "voluntaristic eagerness" (Meyer 2010, p. 12).

If global cultural norms diffuse primarily along transnational network ties, the groups and individuals most connected to the outside world should be the most likely to identify with world society. Empirical work has shown that the individuals most likely to have transnational relationships and the greatest exposure to global cultural scripts tend to be young, educated, and wealthy; speak multiple languages; engage in frequent international travel; live in "global" cities such as London or New York; and hold values and attitudes that reflect global cultural norms (Norris 2000; Sassen 2001; Tarrow 2005, p. 35; Jung 2008; Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008; Fligstein 2009; Pichler 2011; Bayram 2014; Rössel and Schroedter 2015). Here, global identification is a cultural feature of the transnational elite: "A true world citizen knows seven kinds of sushi, recognizes the sound of a didgeridoo, can recite verses from the Koran, handles chopsticks with dexterity, and enjoys the costumed spectacles of Indian cinema" (Boli 2005, p. 397; see also Calhoun 2002, p. 86; Skrbis and Woodward 2013).

Connection to global actors is also a function of social status at the level of states and polities. As such, existing theories suggest that identification with global society may be most common among residents of the powerful states in the global core that dominate international networks (Beckfield 2003, 2010; Hughes et al. 2009) and define the terms of global citizenship in reference to their own interests and cultural features (Carruthers and Halliday 2006, p. 534; Cole 2006; Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 2006). The most powerful and connected states are cast as "exemplars" of global citizenship while weaker states may be cast as "negative exemplars," subjected to public shaming (Halliday, Block-Lieb, and Carruthers 2010) and targeted by international campaigns designed to alter local cultural practices (Barrett and Kurzman 2004; Barrett, Kurzman, and Shanahan 2010). This dynamic may produce antiglobal backlash within targeted populations (Boyle and Carbone-López 2006; Ivković and Hagan 2006), rendering targeted individuals comparatively less likely to identify with world society. Indeed, research on antiglobalization movements generally casts people on the global periphery as particularly resistant to the Western-dominated global order (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Mittelman and Chin 2000; Boyle, McMorris, and Gómez 2002; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005).

The Puzzle of World Citizens on the Global Periphery

Although it makes theoretical sense that the core-periphery structure of global economic, social, and institutional connections would be reproduced in cross-national differences in global identification, empirical research has shown that various measures of global connectedness are in fact negatively associated with cross-national differences in global identification (Jung 2008; Mewes and Mau 2013). Such findings have left scholars puzzled,

prompting them to urge future researchers to explore why populations in sub-Saharan Africa have the highest rates of identification as world citizens, while European rates are among the lowest (Pichler 2011; Bayram 2014). Thus far, the prevalence of self-proclaimed world citizens among populations on the global periphery has resisted explanation, leading some scholars to suggest abandoning the study of global self-identification entirely (e.g., Pichler 2009).

We contend that this tension between empirical and theoretical work on global identification is driven by two dubious assumptions about the nature of collective identification. The first is that most studies of identification with global society implicitly assume that global identities necessarily compete with local identities. This assumption conflicts with general theories that emphasize the nested, multiple, and overlapping nature of collective identification (Wimmer 2008, 2013*a*). A person living in Tangiers might, for instance, identify as Muslim, African, Moroccan, Amazigh, and female all at once without perceiving any contradiction between these identities, even though she may at times emphasize one over the others (Smith-Lovin 2007; Wimmer 2013*a*, p. 81). Thus, although some forms of nationalism explicitly preclude global identities (e.g., Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), people need not be untethered to local identities—as are ideal-typical cosmopolitans or frequent world travelers—in order to identify with global society (Appiah 2005; Tarrow 2005). Taking multiple and overlapping identities as given, the appropriate question shifts toward the conditions under which individuals are motivated to accentuate, downplay, or reject global identities (Brubaker 2004, 2015).

Second, because scholars have largely understood global identification as arising from transnational connections, theoretical and empirical scholarship has tended to focus on elites and residents of countries in the global core as the most likely candidates for world citizenship. This focus has led to the outright exclusion of populations on the global periphery. Tarrow, for example, justifies focusing his analysis solely on Western Europe by arguing that if "there is anywhere in the world where we would see such a shift [toward global political orientations] it would be in Western Europe," and that this trend "is unlikely to be transcended in parts of the world in which internationalization has proceeded less far" (2005, pp. 70, 95). Thus, the predominant theory leads much empirical work to overlook the existence of "rooted cosmopolitans" on the global periphery. Indeed, the mechanisms driving global identification among the transnational class of lawyers, consultants, and business executives in the global core (e.g., Calhoun 2002) likely diverge from the mechanisms driving global identification in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Pichler 2011), although such identification is common within both populations. In what follows, we develop and test a theory of global identification on the global periphery.

THREAT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL IDENTITIES

Threat is the sense that an adverse event is going to happen (Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler 2011). On its face, threat seems an unlikely source of universalistic identities such as membership in the global community. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of studies suggest the opposite: that threat motivates people to emphasize more particularistic and exclusionary identities. In this section, we develop our theory on how threat can elicit global identification. We argue that the insecurity experienced by members of marginalized groups and people on the periphery of the global system as a result of weak or repressive states prompts these individuals to search for reliable allies, potentially emphasizing global identities in the process.

Sources of Threat

Because self-esteem is closely tied to collective identity, individuals generally understand threats to relevant social collectivities as threats to themselves and respond accordingly (Tajfel and Turner 1979). We focus on two key sources of threat. The first pertains to exposure to violence. Scholars have shown that threat results from exposure to many forms of violence, including terrorism (e.g., Huddy and Feldman 2011), state repression (e.g., Wedeen 1999), war (e.g., Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer 2017), and lynching (e.g., Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996).

The second source of threat to social collectivities is the existence of power asymmetries between groups who do not share a common identity (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). Previous research has shown that such power asymmetries generate threat across levels of collectivities: from political parties (e.g., Mason 2015), social movement organizations (e.g., Cunningham and Phillips 2007), and ethnic groups (e.g., Posner 2004) to nation-states (e.g., Rousseau 2006) and transnational religious movements (e.g., Juergensmeyer 2008).

Particularism and Xenophobia in Response to Threat

A vast and influential body of scholarship shows that threat tends to increase in-group identification (Tajfel 1982) and the desire to strengthen the in-group (Wohl, Branscombe, and Reysen 2010), while decreasing trust and affect for out-groups (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003; Mayda 2006; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Much of this scholarship shares an implicit model of identity: that individuals identify with a singular in-group relative to a primary out-group. In experimental studies, for instance, participants are often placed into groups with predetermined identities. The boundaries of these (real or artificial) groups may become more or less salient, and the definitions of these groups more or less inclusive, but within the confines of the experiment, subjects have difficulty emphasizing broader, cross-cutting iden-

tities (e.g., Sherif et al. [1954] 2010). Similarly, many nonexperimental studies focus on changes in the strength of collective identification among individuals who fit neatly into predetermined identity groups, largely overlooking the possibility that individuals simultaneously identify with multiple overlapping and nested social collectivities (Posner 2004, 2007; Wimmer 2008, 2013*a*, 2013*b*; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).

Because many studies constrain collective identification, the finding that exposure to threat narrows in-group definitions is potentially limited to the specific identity group that researchers determine is most relevant to their subjects a priori. The impact of threat on identification with other social collectivities, however, remains unclear. Feinstein (2016*a*, 2016*b*), for example, showed that Americans identify more strongly as American in the face of terrorist attacks and international crises; yet this finding says little about how exposure to these threats influences Americans' identification with other relevant social collectivities—as female, as black, as Hispanic, as Jewish, and so on. Thus, the existing literature largely misses the impact of threat on the "weak identities" through which individuals experience much of their lives (Smith-Lovin 2007).

Moreover, following Blumer (1958), most nonexperimental studies tend to focus on collective identification among members of relatively powerful groups (e.g., Andrews and Seguin 2015), despite subordinate groups generally experiencing the most threat (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). For example, several studies conducted in strong states indicate that exposure to terrorist attacks can produce a rally-around-the-flag effect, wherein people adopt exclusive in-group boundaries and demonize out-groups (Collins 2004; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Gautier, Siegmann, and Van Vuuren 2009; Huddy and Feldman 2011; Shayo and Zussman 2011; Legewie 2013). More recent studies suggest that this reaction occurs because members of these groups share the collective perception that they are stronger than competing out-groups (Feinstein 2016*a*, 2016*b*). Thus, when threatened, people with access to securely positioned particularistic identities will tend to emphasize these identities precisely because these groups are powerful. Drawing on recent work in social psychology, we suggest that members of less securely positioned groups often react differently to threat.

Identity and the Search for Security

Recent scholarship in social psychology shows that individuals seek to restore a sense of control over their lives in the face of threat, often through identification with salient social collectivities (Kay et al. 2009; Friesen et al. 2014). Key to reestablishing psychological stability through collective identification is confirming a "sense of belonging to a community on whose support

one can rely" for "personal security" (Wimmer 2013*a*, p. 5; 2013*b*, p. 172). Collective identification tends to provide the greatest sense of security when individuals perceive the relevant group as having access to security-granting institutions, especially nation-states. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, for example, Americans were more likely to identify as American and tended to define Americanness in terms of support for government policies (Pyszczynski et al. 2003, pp. 101–4; Albertson and Gadarian 2015, pp. 75–77). When individuals believe that a social collectivity lacks access to these security-granting institutions, however, they are less likely to identify with that collectivity as a means for establishing a sense of control over their environments (Kay et al. 2009, pp. 265–66).

Studies that neither focus on collective identification among members of relatively powerful groups nor impose a single identity on their subjects suggest that threat motivates members of groups in less secure positions to emphasize more expansive identities (Rousseau and Veen 2005). Abascal (2015), for example, shows that, when primed with the threat of Hispanic migration, black Americans tend to more broadly identify as "American"; without this threat, they tend to identify only with their race. Similarly, in Malawi, where the Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups are powerful, individual members tend to identify with their own ethnicity and the groups are mutually hostile; by contrast, in Zambia, where both ethnicities are weak vis-à-vis larger ethnic groups, Chewas and Tumbukas identify as "kin" to each other (Posner 2004). Other studies, drawing on data from sub-Saharan Africa, show that individuals are more likely to emphasize local, particularistic identities when they believe representatives of those groups are capable of winning power (Eifert et al. 2010). In comparison, individuals are more likely to emphasize broader scale identities when they believe that access to power requires building a cross-cutting "winning coalition" (Posner 2007, p. 1306). Thus, because collective identity reflects a need to belong to a group that can provide security, members of relatively weak groups will be motivated to emphasize more expansive identities as a means for gaining allies to ensure security in the face of threat. Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical model.

Threat and Global Identities

Bringing this insight to bear on the study of global identification suggests that the places where people look for security in the global order are also the places they will identify with in the face of threat. For many people, because states are the "legitimated actors" in the global system tasked with exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Meyer and Jepperson 2000), the primary source of security will be the nation-state where they reside. For people in places where the state provides effective physical secu-



FIG. 1.—Impact of group threat on collective identification. This figure illustrates our theoretical model for the impact of group threat on collective identification. We expect that individuals with an available, securely positioned particularistic identity will emphasize that identity when faced with threat. Individuals without such an identity will tend to look for allies to bolster their group position and emphasize more inclusive identities to the extent that doing so may earn them allies.

rity, we might expect threat to increase nationalistic and even xenophobic responses, as shown in a number of studies (e.g., Legewie 2013; Feinstein 2016*b*).

However, global identification may follow from threat when the state fails to provide adequate security. This failure can occur under two conditions. The first is when the state is incapable of providing security owing to a lack of organizational or other resources—a "weak state" (Migdal 1988). The second is when a state refuses to provide adequate security to some social categories living within its borders, through either malign neglect or active repression. Thus, residents of weak states, as well as groups that are excluded from state protections in strong states, will be motivated to seek security elsewhere in the face of threat. In many cases, these populations may look to the global order for support.

Global actors and institutions sometimes provide security directly to residents of weak states in the form of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts, both of which have increased considerably since the end of the Cold War (Hagan et al. 2006). Although development aid has many issues, even critics generally tend to support emergency aid aimed at accelerating recovery from natural disasters and other humanitarian crises (Riddell 2008). Similarly, despite some high-profile failures, peacekeeping generally "works" in that it reduces the length of conflict (Fortna 2008), the number of civilian deaths (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013), and the spread of conflict (Beardsley 2011; Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015).

Global actors also offer support to victims of state repression, sometimes giving legal, material, or military aid to targeted populations (Bellamy 2009; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). More often, global actors are involved in "naming and shaming" repressive state practices (Boyle, Songora, and Foss 2001; Hafner-Burton 2008; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008), and

these campaigns are sometimes effective (e.g., Krain 2012). Accordingly, marginalized groups have often appealed to global or international institutions for security or protection when their states neglect or marginalize them (Sikkink 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 2013). For example, Paschel (2010) shows that Afro-Colombians used global policy frames to successfully challenge the Colombian state's policy of malign neglect, Dutton et al. (2017) illustrate how exposure to political violence led Kenyans to support the International Criminal Court, and Tsutsui (2017) documents how ethnic minorities in Japan used international institutions to pressure the Japanese government to adopt remedial policies. Other groups, such as the Zapatistas, Palestinians, and black South Africans in the apartheid era, have used transnational communication networks to appeal directly to populations in powerful countries, using the language of international law and global human rights in a bid to force repressive domestic governments into compliance (Olsen 2005; Barghouti 2011).

By appealing to global actors for security, many locally threatened groups have integrated internationalist and global elements into their collective identities. For instance, domestic oppression was a key factor in the development of black internationalism, the goal of which was to provide "a bridge between blacks in the United States . . . and other peoples of African descent" around the world and create a "heightened sense of urgency and awareness of global racial politics among people of the African diaspora" (Blain 2015, pp. 196, 206). Some African-American intellectual leaders, such as W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey, looked to universalize the scope of the civil rights struggle to encompass other marginalized groups and people on the global periphery by promoting cultural affinity with the Jewish diaspora, the Arab Middle East, China, Cuba, India, Japan, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, among others (DuBois [1955] 1982; Joseph 2006; Marable 2008; Anderson 2014; Blain 2018). In hindsight, these activities appear to have been the beginnings of a global civil rights movement (Fleming and Morris 2015) that has since expanded, linking such disparate groups as Palestinians, Irish nationalists, and Kosovars in international solidarity networks and adding a global dimension to these groups' collective identities (Passy 2001; Tarrow 2005, pp. 109–13; Rolston 2009; Di Stefano and Henaway 2014; Arar 2017; Tabar 2017).

Still other peripheral and marginalized groups embrace explicitly global identities. For example, the Pan-Maya movement that emerged in Guatemala in the late 1980s represented a strategic effort by disparate groups of marginalized indigenous people to craft a unified collective identity using "global imagery," identifying themselves as champions of global culture (Warren 1998, p. 68). Similarly, self-identification as global citizens is a key component of collective identity among Isma'ilis—a relatively small community of Shi'a Muslims located primarily in rural Afghanistan, Paki-

stan, and Tajikistan—and is reinforced by the Isma'ili religious hierarchy's efforts to emphasize its adherents' "membership in a larger global society" and encourage "enthusiastic global participation" through religious decrees, textbooks, and media products (Steinberg 2011, pp. 11–15, 76, 99, 205).

However, because the most influential members of the world polity often determine the requirements for full membership in global society (Carruthers and Halliday 2006, p. 534; Hagan et al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2010), not all peripheral groups can plausibly appeal to global identification in the face of threat. Some, including members and supporters of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Taliban, may feel purposefully excluded from global society (El Husseini 2010). Others who have suffered at the hands of global actors and see support for "global values" as window dressing for promoting the interests of the powerful may consider global society itself to be an existential threat (Von Hippel 2000; Boyle and Carbone-López 2006; Ivković and Hagan 2006; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). Because of the exclusion of these groups from global society and the relative implausibility that their members will adopt global identities, they likely behave similarly to more securely positioned groups in the face of threat: emphasizing more local and particularistic collective identities.

In summary, in contexts of heightened threat, members of neglected, marginalized, and peripheral groups are expected to respond with greater global identification. The exceptions are those denied full inclusion in global society and those who consider global actors an existential threat; they may respond with less global identification. Since much research has already demonstrated that members of relatively securely positioned groups tend to become more isolationist and xenophobic in the face of threat, this study focuses on testing the implication for neglected, marginalized, and peripheral groups.

EXPECTATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

We develop and test hypotheses at several levels of analysis. At the nation-state level, we expect,

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*Individuals living in states that are unwilling or unable to provide security or that pose a threat to the security of their residents will express more global identification than individuals living in stronger, less repressive states.*

At the level of groups within nation-states, we expect,

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Members of groups (racial, ethnic, religious, immigrants, noncitizens, etc.) subject to malign neglect and active marginalization will express more global identification than conationals in more secure positions.*

We test hypotheses 1 and 2 with a series of cross-national regression analyses, drawing on two attitude surveys, coupled with data sets describing configurations of political power within and between countries.

Our theory also suggests that an acute or sudden increase in threat should increase global identification among individuals with little access to local collective identities that ensure security. We thus expect,

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Individuals in weak states will express increases in global identification in response to acute threats.*

However, not everyone can legitimately claim membership in global society in response to threats. As such, we expect,

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*Individuals in weak states who do not perceive global actors as a potential source of security will seek local sources of security in response to increases in threat and may exhibit decreases in global identification.*

We test these expectations by leveraging a discontinuity in the experience of threat (a terrorist attack) in one weak state—Lebanon.

ASSESSING GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN COUNTRIES

Data and Method

Our first set of analyses use individual-level responses to two cross-national survey data sets—the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) third wave on national identity and the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey (WVS)—to test hypotheses 1 and 2 (ISSP Research Group 2015; World Values Survey Association 2014).[2] These two attitudinal surveys are currently the only ones that both capture respondents' identification with world society and measure attitudes cross-nationally. Together, the two surveys include responses from over 100,000 individuals across 56 countries. We consider analyses using the ISSP data as our principal source of evidence and the WVS as a replication analysis because of its issues with item translation and opaque data collection practices (Kurzman 2014).[3]

Our dependent variable in the ISSP data is a survey item that asks individuals to rate the statement "I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country," with a five-item Likert response scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." In our replication analysis using WVS data, we create a similar measure from two survey items: one that asks respon-

[2] The ISSP data were collected between 2012 and 2015, and the WVS data were collected between 2005 and 2009 (fifth wave) and between 2010 and 2014 (sixth wave).

[3] WVS documentation describes data collection efforts in vague terms, primarily offering guidelines that apply in "most countries." To our knowledge, the WVS does not provide post hoc country-by-country sampling method reports.

dents to rate the statement "I see myself as a world citizen" and a second that asks respondents to rate the statement "I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation," both with five-item Likert response scales ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Following Zhou (2016), we use the difference between these two responses to construct a seven-category score of relative attachment to world society that ranges from 0 (strong national identification, no global identification) to 6 (no national identification, strong global identification). Although the operationalization of these variables assumes competition between nationalism and global identification, as already discussed, we do not consider these mutually exclusive sources of identity construction. We deal with this issue in several ways in our analyses.[4]

We merged these survey responses with country-level data from the State Fragility Index and Matrix (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017). From these data, we operationalize *country-level insecurity* using two variables: (1) a measure of state-provided security and vulnerability to political violence and (2) a measure of a state's tendency to repress portions of its population. While these variables potentially capture two distinct sources of country-level insecurity, their high correlation ($r = .78$) suggests that they are closely related, and supplemental analyses indicate that they have nearly identical effects on our dependent variables. To avoid collinearity issues, we created an additive index using these two variables with a theoretical range from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating greater insecurity.

We use two additional cross-national data sets to construct our other key independent variable: a group-level measure of exposure to collective threat. Following Blalock (1967), scholars have often measured exposure to group threat through relative group size (e.g., Andrews and Seguin 2015). Because group size is, however, only a rough proxy for specific threats and political positions (Brown 2010), we construct a more direct measure of group position and threat. First, we use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set to identify members of threatened social categories in each country (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Because the MAR data do not contain information on more securely positioned groups, we then use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set to identify the groups in each country with collective access to state power—groups coded as "monopoly," "dominant," and "senior partner" (Vogt et al. 2015).[5] Following Wimmer (2013*a*), we merged group-level data from both the MAR and the EPR with the individual-level ISSP and WVS data by using responses to survey questions on ethnicity, religion, language

[4] The ISSP variable, e.g., was part of a larger battery of questions on nationalism.

[5] In two countries—the Czech Republic and Germany—the EPR codes the most powerful groups as "irrelevant" because of EPR coders' assessment that ethnicity does not play a role in their political systems. We code these groups as among the most powerful in their countries of residence.

spoken at home, and geographic region on a country-by-country basis.[6] Responses from territories that are not United Nations member-states, countries without identifiable MAR groups, and countries with missing data on our dependent variables were dropped from the sample.[7] See appendixes A and B for a full list of the countries and groups included in the analysis.

Tables 1 and 2 list the 15 identity groups with the highest mean levels of global identification. Note that many groups do not appear in both tables because the ISSP and WVS include different countries in their samples. These tables show that many of the identity groups with the highest levels of global attachment are located in peripheral and semiperipheral countries (e.g., the Philippines, India, Turkey, and Thailand). To the extent that residents of powerful countries appear in the tables, they tend to be at-risk minority groups (e.g., Chechens in Russia, Muslims in France, and Turks in Germany).

Using four variables in the MAR data set that measure levels of political, economic, religious, and linguistic discrimination and variables measuring political power in the EPR, we generate a series of binary variables that identify three distinct categories of social groups in the data according to their experience of collective threat. The first identifies social groups that are meaningfully included in the exercise of state power—groups whose members are among the most powerful in their country of residence and face no systematic group-level discrimination (e.g., Germans in Germany or Arab Muslims in Egypt). The second category captures groups whose members face political, economic, or cultural neglect at the hands of their states (e.g., Roma in many European countries and Berbers in many North African countries).[8] The third category includes social groups whose members are actively marginalized by their domestic states; these groups are coded as experiencing active exclusion

[6] It was relatively simple to identify some identity groups on the basis of single variables—such as Turks in Germany (ethnicity) or Muslims in France (religion). For others, we had to use a more complicated coding scheme. In Thailand, e.g., we coded any individual who identified as belonging to a "tribe" or who speaks a tribal language and lives in the north of the country as a member of the Northern Hill Tribes. The EPR codebook is available at https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas; the MAR codebook is available at http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp.

[7] Non-UN member-states: ISSP: Taiwan; WVS: Hong Kong, Palestine, Puerto Rico, and Palestine. Countries without identifiable MAR groups: ISSP: Japan and Switzerland; WVS: Andorra, Armenia, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Chile, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Yemen. Countries with missing data: WVS: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Great Britain, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Uganda, Macedonia, Tanzania, and Venezuela.

[8] This category includes scores of 1 or 2 ("neglect with/without remedial policies") on the political and economic discrimination scales or a score of 1 ("activity informally restricted") on the religious and linguistic discrimination scales.

TABLE 1
FIFTEEN GROUPS WITH HIGHEST IDENTIFICATION WITH WORLD SOCIETY (ISSP)

Group	Country	Minority	Mean (%)
Christian lowlanders	Philippines	No	71
Igorots	Philippines	Yes	69
SC/ST	India	Yes	66
Muslims	India	Yes	59
Xhosa	South Africa	Yes	57
Hindi (non-SC/ST)	India	No	57
Turks	Germany	Yes	54
Indigenous peoples	Mexico	Yes	52
Kurds	Turkey	Yes	51
Asians	South Africa	Yes	51
Chechens	Russia	Yes	48
Catalans	Spain	Yes	47
Muslims	France	Yes	47
Turks	Turkey	No	46
Spanish	Spain	No	40

NOTE.—This table represents the percentage of respondents in each group who "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement "I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country." Only minority groups with 25 or more respondents in a country are represented. Eleven of the top 15 groups are minority groups designated as minorities at risk. Christian lowlanders are people who are part of an informal ethnic coalition in the Philippines consisting of the following ethnic/ethnolinguistic groups: Tagalog, Ilokano, Pangasinan, Bikolano, Waray-Waray, Aklan, Ilongo (Hiligaynon), and Cebuano. SC/ST = scheduled castes and tribes.

TABLE 2
FIFTEEN GROUPS WITH HIGHEST IDENTIFICATION WITH WORLD SOCIETY (WVS)

Group	Country	Minority	Mean (%)
Kurds	Turkey	Yes	38
Chinese	Thailand	Yes	34
Assamese	India	Yes	34
SC/ST	India	Yes	33
Russians	Ukraine	Yes	31
Russians	Belarus	Yes	31
Hindi (non-SC/ST)	India	No	30
Baluchis	Pakistan	Yes	27
Gagauz	Moldova	Yes	21
Quebecois	Canada	Yes	20
Poles	Belarus	Yes	19
Muslims	India	Yes	19
Pashtuns	Pakistan	Yes	18
Hausa-Fulani	Nigeria	Yes	17
Yoruba	Nigeria	No	17

NOTE.—This table represents the percentage of respondents in each group who expressed higher levels of agreement to the statement "I feel like a world citizen" than the statement "I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation." Only minority groups with 25 or more respondents in a country are represented. Thirteen of the top 15 groups were designated as minorities at risk. SC/ST = scheduled castes and tribes.



FIG. 2.—Global attachment of members of neglected and marginalized groups vis-à-vis included groups. The figure shows the country-level mean differences between members of minority groups and dominant groups for our measures of global identification. Error bars indicate one standard deviation. The figure shows that members of minority groups generally express more global attachment than dominant groups within their countries, with more threatened minority groups tending to express higher levels of global attachment than less threatened minority groups.

and repression (e.g., Kurds in Turkey and Chechens in Russia).[9] Figure 2 shows country-level mean differences in our measures of global identification between members of included, neglected, and marginalized groups.

Although perceived discrimination is necessary to translate threat into global identification, we focus on objective measures of discrimination rather than subjective group-level grievances. We take this approach because, while all groups in the MAR that experience systematic discrimination also express group-level grievances, there is a handful of groups with substantial perceived group-level grievances despite enjoying relatively secure political and economic conditions (e.g., white South Africans).[10] Theoretically, we would not expect such grievances to cause members of these groups to iden-

[9] This category includes scores of 3 or 4 ("social exclusion" or "repression") on the political and economic discrimination scales or a score of 2 ("activity formally restricted") on the religious and linguistic discrimination scales.

[10] Treating the sums of the MAR measures of grievances and discrimination as continuous variables, the two are highly correlated at the group level ($r = .78$ in ISSP, $r = .78$ in WVS).

tify with global society. However, supplemental analyses excluding these relatively powerful but aggrieved groups indicate that perceived grievances are related to identification with global society in much the same way as neglect and marginalization.[11]

At the country level, our key independent variable is the index measuring *country-level insecurity*. Owing to the small number of country-level observations in our data (ISSP $N = 20$; WVS $N = 44$), we do not include additional covariates at this level of analysis. At the group level, our key independent variables are the binary indicators of whether an individual belongs to a group that faces *neglect* or *marginalization*, with groups with collective access to state power and facing no systematic discrimination (i.e., included groups) as the omitted baseline category. We also include several potential confounding variables identified by previous literature. The first is a binary variable indicating that a respondent is a member of the *urban elite*, coded 1 if the respondent (1) lives in a large city or suburb and (2) is at least one standard deviation above the country mean for education or (3) is at least one standard deviation above the country mean for household income.[12] In our primary model using ISSP data, we include a measure of national identification that asks respondents "How close do you feel to [country]?" with a four-item response scale ranging from "not close at all" to "very close," a binary variable coded 1 if a respondent is a citizen of the country in which he or she resides, a binary variable coded 1 if a respondent is female, and a measure of age in decades.[13]

[11] In these analyses, we use the MAR grievances data to break individuals into three groups: those with no grievances (sum of all grievances equals zero), those with low grievances (sum of all grievances is between zero and 3.5, the median in both data sets), and those with high grievances (sum of all grievances is greater than 3.5). We then used these grievance categories as the key independent variables in place of our neglect and marginalization variables. Models using the alternative variables produce results substantively similar to those of our main models as long as South Africa—where whites express considerable group-level grievances but experience no systematic discrimination—is excluded.

[12] For most countries in the WVS, we coded respondents as living in an urban or suburban area if the size of their town exceeded 100,000 inhabitants. In Jordan and South Africa, however, the largest reported town size of any respondent was 50,000–100,000 inhabitants. As a result, we consider individuals in towns of that size urban or suburban in those two countries, which allows us to keep both relatively underrepresented countries in the sample. Supplemental models excluding Jordan and South Africa provide results substantively similar to those of the models presented in this article.

[13] We do not include the first variable in our analyses using the WVS data because our dependent variable is a composite that includes a measure of national identification. While this is less than ideal, it is the best way to replicate the more straightforward question in the ISSP data and has a precedent in the literature on this topic (Zhou 2016). The WVS does not include a systematic measure of citizenship.

To test our hypotheses at the nation-state and group levels, we ran a series of ordinal logistic regressions with country-level random and fixed effects on our dependent variables.[14] For individual i in country j, the model is

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{\Pr(Y_{ij} \leq m|X)}{\Pr(Y_{ij} > m|X)}\right) = \tau_m - X_{ij}\beta + U_j,$$

where m is a category for the ordinal global identification variable, τ is a cut point, X_{ij} is a matrix of individual-level covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, and U_j is a country-specific random or fixed effect. We use robust standard errors clustered around country in all models. To deal with missing data, we imputed missing data points using iterative chained equations, creating 10 imputations and transforming all variables before imputing (Von Hippel 2009). As a robustness check, we also ran all models using list-wise deletion of observations missing on our key independent variables (approximately 14% of observations in both data sets), with substantively similar results.[15]

Results

The coefficient plots in figures 3 and 4 illustrate our model results using ISSP and WVS data, respectively. Table 3 contains the results of all models, with effects reported as odds ratios. The results indicate that higher levels of collective threat are associated with higher probabilities of self-identifying as a world citizen. These results are broadly supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2: coefficients for our measures of country-level insecurity as well as group-level neglect and marginalization are positively and significantly associated with identification as a world citizen in all models across both data sets. The

[14] While the use of fixed effects in nonlinear regression models can produce inconsistent coefficients, this is an issue only when the number of observations per group is small. In the case of cross-national survey data, which have hundreds or thousands of observations per country, this is not an issue (Hsiao 2014). As a robustness check, we also ran a series of linear regression models with country-level random and fixed effects, treating the ordinal variable as continuous, with substantively similar results.

[15] These missing observations occur because we could not identify some individuals as belonging to a discrete group in the MAR or EPR data. This happened when the MAR or EPR did not include data on members of a given group (e.g., people identifying as Sundanese in the Indonesian WVS sample); when individuals had missing data for language, religion, and/or ethnicity (e.g., respondents choosing "other" as ethnicity in the French ISSP sample); or when the available language, religion, and/or ethnicity categories did not match the MAR and/or EPR categories (e.g., in Colombia, the WVS contains a single ethnic category for "mulatto/mestizo," in the EPR mestizos are classified as being in the same category as whites, and in the MAR data mulattos are classified as being in the same group as Afro-Colombians).



FIG. 3.—Coefficient plot for ordinal regression models on self-identification as a world citizen (ISSP). Bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals for each coefficient. For all models, $N = 27{,}827$, and number of countries = 20. Open circles represent results of bivariate models for each independent variable, and closed circles represent results for the full models that include all independent variables. Gray lines represent results of random-effects models, and black lines represent results of fixed-effects models. Results are reported in odds ratios. "Insecurity" represents the country-level insecurity variable that was used only in random-effects models. In the full models, the effects for the neglect and marginalization variables are statistically significant at the $P < .001$ level (two-tailed tests).

robustness of this result to the inclusion of two variables measuring identification with and connection to the nation suggests that it is not driven by a lack of nationalism among groups facing systematic discrimination. Consistent with previous empirical research, we find that young people are more likely to identify as world citizens. Our results suggest that urban elites may exhibit higher levels of global identification than other sociodemographic groups, but this effect is not statistically significant in any of our models.



FIG. 4.—Coefficient plot for ordinal regression models on self-identification as a world citizen (WVS). Bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals for each coefficient. For all models, $N = 27{,}827$, the number of country-waves = 59, and the number of countries = 44. Open circles represent results of bivariate models for each independent variable, and closed circles represent results for the full models that include all independent variables. Gray lines represent results of random-effects models, and black lines represent results of fixed-effects models. Results are reported in odds ratios. "Insecurity" represents the country-level insecurity variable that was used only in random-effects models. In the full models, the effect for the neglect variable is statistically significant at the $P < .01$ level and the effect for the marginalization variable is statistically significant at the $P < .001$ level (two-tailed tests).

Alternative Explanations

Here we address six key threats to validity. First, while we find that identification with global society is related to country-level insecurity, this relationship could result from an omitted third variable—transnational connections at the country level. On its face, this outcome would seem unlikely since weak states tend to be less connected to global networks. According

TABLE 3
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS ON IDENTIFICATION WITH WORLD SOCIETY

	International Social Survey Programme				World Values Survey			
	Random Effects		Fixed Effects		Random Effects		Fixed Effects	
	Bivariate	Multivariate	Bivariate	Multivariate	Bivariate	Multivariate	Bivariate	Multivariate
Country-level insecurity	1.18*	1.17*			1.19***	1.16**		
	(.10)	(.09)			(.06)	(.06)		
Neglected	1.42***	1.39***	1.41***	1.38***	1.34**	1.35**	1.34**	1.35**
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Marginalized	1.70***	1.49***	1.70***	1.49***	1.33**	1.36***	1.33**	1.36***
	(.25)	(.15)	(.25)	(.15)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)
Female	.97	.97	.97	.97	.99	.99	.99	.99
	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Age	.91***	.93***	.91***	.93***	.94***	.94***	.94***	.94***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Urban elite	1.08	1.07	1.08	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.05	1.04
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
National identification	.77***	.79***	.77***	.79***				
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)				
Citizen	.51***	.63***	.51***	.63***				
	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)				
Observations	27,827	27,827	27,827	27,827	91,079	91,079	91,079	91,079
Countries	20	20	20	20	44	44	44	44

NOTE.—Cells in columns labeled "bivariate" contain results of individual bivariate regression models. All models employ robust SEs clustered around countries. Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

to existing theory, however, country-level embeddedness in global social, economic, and institutional networks should be the primary factor driving identification with global society among individuals. We attempted to test the effect of insecurity against the effect of global embeddedness using the KOF globalization index, perhaps the most complete and comprehensive data on embeddedness in global networks (Dreher 2006).[16] We found that these measures are substantially negatively correlated ($r = -.76$ in ISSP, $r = -.45$ in WVS), posing multicollinearity issues in addition to limited statistical power due to small sample size at the country level ($N = 20$ in ISSP, $N = 44$ in WVS). As such, in supplemental analyses we included the KOF globalization index in place of the country-level insecurity measure in our random-effects models.[17] Consistent with prior empirical work (e.g., Pichler 2011; Bayram 2014), we found that the association between the KOF index and identification with global society was negative, but not statistically significant, in all models.

Second, our findings raise a question common to investigations of global identification: to what extent does our measure capture a lack of nationalism rather than a positive and purposeful association with world society? While the former is possible—particularly in the replication analyses using WVS data—we do not think that this alternative interpretation is likely, particularly since global and national identifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Wimmer 2008, 2013*a*; Beck 2011; Calhoun 2012; Beck and Levy 2013; Zhou 2016). In the ISSP, which contains questions on both explicitly global and explicitly national identification, we find that the two survey items are only weakly negatively correlated ($r = -.13$), and there are substantial numbers of respondents at all possible points on the national-global identification matrix, with no empty cells. Likewise, including the national identification variable in ordinal logistic regression models has a statistically null effect on the coefficients for our measures of threat (i.e., it does not attenuate them), although the effect of national identification is itself negative and statistically significant. In the WVS, measures of global and national identification are weakly positively correlated ($r = .21$).[18] As a robustness check, we

[16] We attempted to measure embeddedness using other variables including intergovernmental organization and international nongovernmental organization linkages and network centrality, but country-level data on these measures are unavailable for both our ISSP sample and the sixth wave of the WVS (these data end in the early 2000s). Supplemental analyses using these data with the fifth wave of the WVS (not reported) indicate a statistically null relationship with our dependent variable.

[17] In addition, we also tried models including a modified version of the KOF index that did not include the measures of cultural proximity (numbers of McDonald's and Ikea stores per capita), with substantively similar results.

[18] The positive correlation in the WVS and negative correlation in the ISSP are likely due to the fact that the ISSP question asks about world citizenship over any nation, while the WVS asks only about world citizenship.

used the original WVS question measuring world citizenship as our dependent variable and included national identification as a control, with similar results. This outcome suggests that the effect of threat on global identification is not reducible to a lack of national identification among members of threatened groups. Future research should investigate the conditions under which national identities compete with global identities.

Third, because respondents were asked about their identification with a specific set of discrete social categories in both surveys, analyses using these data unavoidably overlook some expressions of collective identity entirely. For example, Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria would probably strongly identify with an independent Kurdistan if asked by survey researchers. As with the question of national identification, our findings are threatened only if collective identifications are, by nature, mutually exclusive. Instead, it is quite plausible that many Kurds strongly identify with a potential independent Kurdistan yet simultaneously see themselves as world citizens (Fisher Onar and Paker 2012; see also Laitin 1998; Brubaker and Kim 2011). This would likely be reinforced by experiences of threat from neighboring states: an independent Kurdistan would probably be landlocked, militarily weak, and surrounded by hostile neighbors. Such a nascent nation-state might seek to ensure its security by appealing to international organizations and other powerful global actors. Thus, while these unmeasured identities are important, they likely do not pose a threat to our argument.

Fourth, readers may wonder if grouping such diverse social collectivities overlooks how differences between these groups may affect whether and how members relate to the outside world. As such, in supplemental analyses we tested relationships between global identification and four MAR variables that ostensibly differentiate groups on the following dimensions: transnational dispersion, administrative autonomy, expressed separatism, and external support from diaspora members. We also manually coded each group in the MAR data into one of four categories: beached diasporas (Laitin 1998) and expatriates, immigrants, refugees, and indigenous minorities. We found no statistically significant differences in global identification between groups along any of these axes.

Fifth, we tested the robustness of our results to alternative operationalizations of group threat and outliers at the country or group level in several ways. First, we explored alternative operationalizations for our key independent variables measuring group threat, including a simple dummy for whether the respondent belonged to a group that experienced any discrimination, as well as a linear coding that was the standardized sum of the discrimination scores in the MAR data. Both these variables were significant predictors of global identification in all variations of our models across both data sets ($P < .01$). Second, we assessed the robustness of our coding of excluded groups. In principle, our coding scheme could categorize a politically powerful group

within a country as excluded because of ongoing discrimination. To assess this possibility, we searched for any cases in which a group was both (1) coded in the EPR as being "dominant," "monopoly," or "senior partner" in terms of power in government and (2) also listed as experiencing discrimination in the MAR data. We found that South Africa contained the only example of this phenomenon in the Zulus ("senior partner" in the EPR and neglected by our categorization). We therefore reran our analyses without South Africa as a robustness check with similar results. Third, to assess robustness of our results to the impact of any specific cases, we reran all models, dropping one country at a time. These analyses confirm that our results are not driven by a single outlying case. Finally, because some countries were left out of the cross-national analyses owing to not having any identifiable minority groups, we added those countries back into the sample to assess the robustness of our national insecurity result, again with similar results.

Sixth, while our results show that more threatened groups tend to express higher levels of global identification, they are purely cross-sectional. Ideally, we would also test whether changes in experiences of threat are associated with increases in global identification among members of the same group. We now turn to such an analysis.

ACUTE THREAT AND GLOBAL ATTACHMENT ON THE PERIPHERY

Reactions to Terrorism in Lebanon

Our second analysis explores changes in experiences of threat over time in relation to a terrorist attack in Lebanon.[19] The attack occurred in suburban Beirut on July 9, 2013, as researchers were fielding the third wave of the Arab Barometer survey, leading to comparable pre- and postattack samples of respondents.[20] Because the attack was unanticipated, occurred suddenly, claimed numerous victims, and shattered years of relative peace, we consider it to be a sharp discontinuity in the experience of threat to personal security: in its immediate aftermath, changes in attitudes are more likely to be related to the attack than to some other unknown events. We analyze

[19] Owing to the limited intersection between attitude survey fielding periods and terrorist attacks in peripheral states, this attack was the only suitable one that we found through a systematic search. We looked for overlaps in terrorist attacks targeting civilians captured by the START Global Terrorism Database and several attitudes surveys including the Arab Barometer, the Afrobarometer, the WVS, the European Values Survey, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and the ISSP survey on national identification. We identified attacks in Iraq in June 2013 (Arab Barometer) and in Pakistan in April 2010 (Pew Global Attitudes Project), but they did not represent a clear discontinuity in the experience of terrorism because they were incidents in the midst of an ongoing series of attacks.

[20] In all cases that we analyze, each comparison group (before and after the attack) had at least 50 respondents, a group sample size generally larger than those used in psychology experiments (see Marszalek et al. 2011).

the effects of the attack on global identification among residents of two governorates (administrative regions) of Lebanon: Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon. For Mount Lebanon, where outside intervention has historically followed appeals for security assistance from local actors, we find an increase in enthusiasm for global connection in the wake of the attack. By contrast, in South Lebanon, where historical relations with the international community have been more destructive and conflictual, respondents were less enthusiastic about global connection, and more supportive of local security institutions, in the wake of the attack.

Lebanon as a Case

We theorize that insecurity in weak states should lead to increased identification with global society, except when the international community is not perceived as a potential source of security. Lebanon, which has historically been unable to control its borders, unable to limit the activities of nonstate actors and establish a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, ineffective at fostering a united national identity, and vulnerable to external intervention, is widely characterized as a weak state (Messara 1991; Mubārak 2004; Aṣ-Ṣa'dūn 2007; Ṣafā 2010; Ziādeh 2010; Dāgher 2012; Hazbun 2016; Vignal 2017). Although Lebanon's unique sociopolitical configuration and the historical relations between various Lebanese communities and foreign powers present potential problems for generalizing our findings, prior research suggests that state weakness, social fractionalization, and recurrent foreign intervention at the behest of competing factions are relatively common features of developing and postcolonial societies (Bose 1991; Bieber 2000; El-Khazen 2000; Raḥma 2003; Dombroski 2007; Abū Jawdah 2008; Fāris 2015; Lilli 2015).[21] Lebanon's regional heterogeneity also allows us to evaluate the effect of threat on global identification among populations with varying historical relationships with global actors. As such, we consider Lebanon an excellent case in which to test the links between threat, state weakness, and identification with global society.

In the following section, we analyze the link between threat and global identification in two regions of Lebanon. In the first, Mount Lebanon, the governorate surrounding Beirut and the site of the bombing, we would expect residents to respond to threat by emphasizing their membership in global society. Mount Lebanon has a reputation for exceptional openness to the outside world, but many local and outside observers consider the nar-

[21] Other countries and regions local Lebanese and Western scholars have explicitly compared to Lebanon in this regard include, e.g., Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Ghana, Iraq, Ireland, Kashmir, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Palestine, Serbia, Sudan, apartheid-era South Africa, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

rative of a globally oriented Greater Beirut to be a myth propagated by political elites. They point out that most of its inhabitants are decidedly local in their day-to-day concerns, experiences, and social networks (Arzūnī 2012; Dāgher 2012; Fregonese 2012; Seidman 2012; Moussawi 2017). Moreover, Mount Lebanon is in many ways broadly representative of the Lebanese population as a whole. Home to nearly 40% of all Lebanese, it is among the most diverse of Lebanon's governorates in terms of religious sect, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, containing both wealthy communities and impoverished slums (Yassin 2012). As such, we consider Mount Lebanon a good place to test hypothesis 3 by investigating how a broad cross section of Lebanese respond to acute threats to physical security.

South Lebanon, whose major population center, Sidon, is located about 20 miles from the site of the attack, is quite different from its neighbor to the north. Most relevant here is the region's history of particularly destructive relations with the outside world. During the 1970–2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, residents of South Lebanon withstood thousands of missile attacks and five Israeli invasions (Norton 2014). The United Nations established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in March 1978, and it remains in South Lebanon to the present day. UNIFIL was initially greeted with optimism, but its subsequent history of "questionable activities" led many in South Lebanon to see it as a belligerent in local conflicts rather than a peacekeeping force (Norton and Schwedler 1993, p. 66; see also Skogmo 1989, pp. 242–61; Heiberg 1991; Pelcovits 1991; Hirst 1999; Fisk 2002, pp. 134–59).[22] One-third of the population in South Lebanon suffers symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder—including hypervigilance and hypersensitivity to images, reports, and experiences of violence (Farhood, Dimassi, and Lehtinen 2006; Khamis 2015)—and their experiences have contributed to "a certain xenophobia" among Southern Lebanese (Beydoun 1992, p. 51). Moreover, South Lebanon has historically been influenced and governed by armed militias including Hezbollah—a political entity considered to be a terrorist organization by some of the most powerful global actors (Byman 2003). The combination of proximity to the attack and a history of destructive relationships with a variety of global actors makes South Lebanon a good context to test hypothesis 4: that acute experiences of threat in weak states will not increase global identification among

[22] The questionable activities include allowing continued importation of arms into the region, declining to resist multiple Israeli incursions and invasions, and failing to prevent sectarian militias such as the secessionist South Lebanon Army from harassing local populations. As recently as 2010, Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas, former commander of the UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, issued a statement to the Lebanese press directed at residents of the south denying any "hidden agenda" behind UNIFIL's ongoing presence there. The statement was made following a series of confrontations between UNIFIL troops and local communities (Bar'el 2010).

members of groups who do not perceive global actors as a potential source of security.

Data and Method

On July 9, 2013, terrorists detonated a car bomb in a supermarket parking lot in Bir el-Abed, a suburb of Beirut located in the Mount Lebanon governorate. Occurring on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan—a busy shopping day—in a crowded area known for its open-air marketplaces, the attack injured at least 53 people and shattered more than a half decade of relative peace. It was the most destructive attack on civilians in Lebanon since the political crisis that culminated in the 2008 Doha Agreement (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016). Although several groups have been accused of carrying out the attack—from Israeli agents to the Free Syrian Army to al-Qaida affiliates and the so-called Islamic State—to date, the identity of the perpetrators remains unclear (An-Nahar 2013). The discontinuity in threat experienced by Lebanese as a result of this attack forms the basis for our analysis.

We measure the impact of the Beirut bombing on global identification, using attitudinal data from the third wave of the Arab Barometer, which was being fielded in Lebanon when the attack occurred. We compare survey responses before and after the attack for three different questions in the Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon governorates.[23] The first question captures how respondents view the impact of increasing *global connection* on Lebanese society, with a five-item response scale ranging from "very bad" to "very good." The second question measures attitudes about the ideal level of *global trade*, with a five-item response scale ranging from a desire for a "strong decrease" to a "strong increase." The third question asks whether Lebanon should be more or less *open to the outside world*, with a three-item response scale. Although the Arab Barometer does not contain a direct measure of identification with global society, these questions tap into a desire for proximity with the outside world.[24] Because there is a strong link between

[23] We exclude the Beirut, Beqaa, and Nabatieh governorates because of inadequate preattack observations: in Beirut there are only 10 postattack observations, in Beqaa there are only 29 preattack observations, and in Nabatieh there are no preattack observations. We exclude the North Lebanon governorate because it is far from the site of the attack, though supplemental analyses show that its residents responded similarly to those of the Mount Lebanon governorate.

[24] We attempted to validate the relationship between these questions and explicit identification as a world citizen by looking at correlations with similar questions. No survey items are clear matches with these three questions in either the WVS or the ISSP. We further considered a host of additional data sets including the European Values Survey, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and the Afrobarometer, none of which contain questions measuring identification as a global citizen.

perceived similarity and desire for proximity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, pp. 435–37), expressions of collective identity are often considered equivalent to a desire for proximity with others that share that identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Wimmer 2013*a*, p. 5). Therefore, we consider these questions reasonable proxies for measures of identification as such.

Analyzing these three questions in two governorates yields six pre-/postattack comparisons. We expect positive effects from the attack on desire for proximity to the global community in Mount Lebanon and null or negative effects in South Lebanon. We include a number of potential confounding variables identified by previous literature in our analysis of differences in pre- and postattack attitudes. Because Lebanon has a confessional political system that explicitly allots political power, employment opportunities, education, and personal status laws on the basis of religious sect (Binder 1966; Raḥma 2003; Arzūnī 2012), we follow Cammett (2011) and include binary variables indicating belonging to one of Lebanon's three major sectarian groups: Sunnis, Shi'a, and Christians. In addition, we test other theoretically relevant measures that may influence identification with global society: multilingualism, gender, whether the respondent had visited the West in the past five years, age, household computer ownership, and a binary variable identifying urban elites.[25] Because of imbalances between pre- and postattack samples on a small number of these potential confounding variables (we discuss the magnitude of these imbalances and their impact on our statistical results at the end of this section), we treat this case as a regression discontinuity analysis that includes these variables as controls rather than a true natural experiment (see, e.g., Rao, Yue, and Ingram 2011, pp. 372–74).

To evaluate the effect of the attack on desire for global proximity we ran a series of ordinal logistic regression models on our dependent variables. For each dependent variable, the model for individual i is the following:

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{\Pr(Y_i \leq m|X)}{\Pr(Y_i > m|X)}\right) = \tau_m - X_i\beta + U,$$

where m is a category for the dependent variable, τ is a cut point, X_i is a matrix of individual-level covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, and U is a constant term. Observations with missing values are dropped from the analyses ($N = 3$). Because of missing preattack observations, we drop all Armenian, Assyrian, and Druze respondents from the sample.[26] We drop all Christian respon-

[25] We constructed this variable identically to the corresponding variable in the cross-national analyses.

[26] These small ethnoreligious groups constitute approximately 4%, 2%, and 5% of the Lebanese population, respectively. Supplemental analyses including these respondents produce substantively similar results.

dents in South Lebanon because the preattack sample did not include any Christians.[27]

Results

Table 4 displays the results of all six models across both governorates with effects reported as odds ratios. Figure 5 displays mean comparisons in our three questions measuring desire for proximity with global society among pre- and postattack samples in both regions.[28] Results show that residents of Mount Lebanon were significantly more likely to endorse global connection, more enthusiastic about global trade, and more likely to express a desire for Lebanon to be more open to the outside world following the attack. In contrast, residents of South Lebanon were less likely to endorse global connection, less enthusiastic about global trade, and marginally less likely to express a desire for Lebanon to be more open to the outside world. These results are consistent with hypotheses 3 and 4, indicating that acute experiences of threat in weak states will increase global identification, except for members of groups that do not consider global actors to be a potential source of security. In the latter groups, such experiences may decrease global identification.

Our theory also suggests that threat may produce a "rally-around-the-flag" effect (e.g., Feinstein 2016*a*) among members of groups that are stigmatized and excluded from global society, despite the relative weakness of the social collectivities to which they belong. We test this element of hypothesis 4 by investigating whether the attack affected attitudes toward security-related institutions through two questions that ask respondents to rate the performance of the *government* and *police* in carrying out their duties, with five-item response scales ranging from "very bad" to "very good." Analyzing responses to these questions in each governorate yields four comparisons, the results of which are illustrated in figure 6 (see app. C for full model results). The attack had no statistically significant effect on either variable in Mount Lebanon, suggesting that its residents do not turn to local security institutions when faced with threat. Consistent with hypothesis 4, a statistically significant increase occurs in the assessments of both government and police performance in South Lebanon following the attack.

[27] Supplemental analyses including these respondents produce substantively similar results.

[28] Statistical significance levels in fig. 5 are from the ordinal logistic regression models reported in table 4.

TABLE 4
Ordinal Logistic Regressions on Desire for Proximity with Global Society in Lebanon Following the Beirut Attack

	Global Connection		Global Trade		Open to World	
	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon
Beirut attack	2.73***	.12***	2.86***	.30*	2.15*	.29
	(.78)	(.08)	(.93)	(.15)	(.79)	(.19)
Urban elite	.68	2.86	1.19	1.45	1.14	1.31
	(.22)	(1.57)	(.37)	(.70)	(.43)	(.73)
Multilingual	2.24	.71	.85	1.68	1.47	.54
	(.95)	(.33)	(.38)	(1.02)	(.75)	(.34)
Visited West	1.57	.63	.57	.25	1.22	.93
	(.63)	(.36)	(.18)	(.19)	(.62)	(.60)
Owns computer	1.41	5.89***	1.34	1.68	1.22	2.61
	(.66)	(2.34)	(.47)	(1.21)	(.63)	(1.76)
Female	.83	1.35	.79	.98	.68	.75
	(.26)	(.54)	(.23)	(.40)	(.24)	(.36)
Age	1.21	.84	.99	1.42	1.11	1.83*
	(.17)	(.15)	(.10)	(.31)	(.18)	(.50)
Shi'a	.40**	.09***	.97	.19***	.21***	.32*
	(.13)	(.05)	(.30)	(.09)	(.08)	(.17)
Sunni	.77		5.58*		3.83	
	(.37)		(4.80)		(3.73)	
Observations	387	110	385	109	387	107
Pre/post	69/318	50/60	68/317	50/59	69/318	50/57

Note.—All models employ robust SEs. For Mount Lebanon, Christian is the excluded baseline sectarian category. For South Lebanon, Sunni is the excluded baseline sectarian category. Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

Alternative Explanations

The validity of our findings may have limits. First, a possibility exists that respondents intentionally and systematically sorted into pre- and postattack groups, a problem common to regression discontinuity designs. However, the attack occurred without warning, and survey samples had been randomly determined (clustered in groups of 10 by neighborhood) and interviews already scheduled by the Arab Barometer survey researchers. Consequently, respondents would have had neither the motivation nor the ability to sort around the discontinuity at the time of sampling. Moreover, we confirmed with the Arab Barometer project director that the attack had no effect on sample attrition. Thus, while these samples are not quite as-if random, our regression discontinuity design is still preferable to traditional regression designs because it requires less stringent assumptions for



FIG. 5.—Lebanese response to the Beirut bombing: desire for proximity with global society. The figure shows the mean level of expression of enthusiasm for global connection, global trade, and openness to the world, treating Likert scales as continuous variables, in two governorates of Lebanon before and after the Beirut bombing. Light gray bars indicate preattack means, dark gray bars indicate postattack means, and error bars indicate one standard deviation from mean values. With all three dependent variables, the mean was higher in Mount Lebanon and lower in South Lebanon following the attack. In ordinal logistic regression models, these effects are statistically significant in five out of six comparisons and marginally significant in one. Reported significance levels are from models with controls and robust SEs (see table 4): $^{+}P < .10$, $*P < .05$, $**P < .01$, $***P < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

identification. As one example, because respondents did not intentionally sort into treatment and nontreatment groups, no possibility exists for reciprocal effects or reverse causality (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001; see also Caughey and Sekhon 2011, p. 405; Eggers et al. 2015, p. 272).

Second, unintentional sorting due to sampling design may possibly have produced imbalances in theoretically relevant covariates that are driving our results. We discuss imbalances in Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon in turn. For Mount Lebanon, the only statistically significant imbalance is in sect: the percentage of Sunnis drops from 29% before the attack to 3% after the attack, and the percentage of Christians rises from 57% to 79%. There are no statistically significant differences in the samples for any of the other seven control variables. While this imbalance is potentially disconcerting, we do not believe that it is driving our results. First, because Christians and Sunnis occupy similar positions in Lebanon's confessional political system—the office of the president is reserved for Maronite Christians and the office of the prime minister for Sunni Muslims—our theory



FIG. 6.—Lebanese response to the Beirut bombing: attitudes toward domestic security institutions. The figure shows the mean ratings of government and police performance in two governorates of Lebanon before and after the Beirut bombing. Light gray bars indicate preattack means, dark gray bars indicate postattack means, and error bars indicate one standard deviation from mean values. In Mount Lebanon, the pre-/postattack difference was null for both variables in ordinal logistic regression models. In South Lebanon, by contrast, responses for both variables were statistically significantly higher after the attack. This result provides some evidence that residents of South Lebanon may have experienced a "rally-around-the-flag" effect. Reported significance levels are from ordinal logistic regression models with controls and robust SEs (see app. C): $*P < .05$, $**P < .01$, $***P < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

suggests that Christians and Sunnis should react to threat in similar ways.[29] Second, the results of our models indicate that, if anything, Lebanese Christians may be less enthusiastic about proximity to global society than Sunnis (see table 4), and as such, this imbalance may influence the model results against our expectations as stated in hypothesis 3.

The imbalances in South Lebanon are potentially more troubling. We identified statistically significant differences in pre- and postattack samples for three of seven control variables: in demographics—the average age decreases from 37 before the attack to 30 after the attack and the percentage of households with computers decreases from 96% to 73%—as well as in the percentage of Shi'a respondents, which increases from 60% before the at-

[29] The allotment of political positions on the basis of religious sect is codified in the Constitution of Lebanon, arts. 9, 10, 19, and 95.

tack to 83% after the attack. The Shi'a imbalance is particularly worrying given their subordinated position in Lebanese politics, relatively high levels of support for Hezbollah, and a particularly negative historical relationship with Western actors and international organizations. Table 4 indicates that Shi'a express significantly lower enthusiasm for global connection compared with Christians and Sunnis. Thus, it appears that, with the exception of age, observed imbalances in South Lebanon may be biased toward confirming hypothesis 4. Table 5 summarizes the observed imbalances in both governorates and their potential impact on our results.

We use two additional strategies to assess the impact of imbalances. First, we include covariates in all of our models to control for observed imbalances. Controlling for observed imbalances does not affect the direction or significance of our findings in Mount Lebanon, while for South Lebanon the post-

TABLE 5
Imbalances in Lebanon and Expected Impacts on Model Results, by Governorate

	Mount Lebanon		South Lebanon	
	β	Expected Bias	β	Expected Bias
Urban elite	.02	...	.16	...
	(.07)		(.08)	
Multilingual	.04	...	.16	...
	(.05)		(.08)	
Visited West	−.02	...	.00	...
	(.06)		(.06)	
Owns computer	.03	...	−.23**	In favor
	(.05)		(.07)	
Female	.00	...	.00	...
	(.07)		(.10)	
Age	.21	...	−.70**	Against
	(.20)		(.23)	
Shi'a	.04	...	.23**	In favor
	(.05)		(.08)	
Sunni	−.26***	Unclear		
	(.03)			

Note.—Each cell in columns labeled β reports coefficients for bivariate regression models with the postattack dummy as the independent variable (two-tailed tests). For the binary control variables (all except age), the coefficient represents the percentage change between the pre- and postattack samples. For age, the coefficient represents the mean change in decades between the pre- and postattack samples. Each cell in Expected Bias columns reports the effect that a given imbalance may have on the observed relationship between the postattack variable and our measures of desire for proximity with global society based on prior theory and empirical results from table 4. For Mount Lebanon, Christian is the excluded baseline sectarian category. For South Lebanon, Sunni is the excluded baseline sectarian category.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

attack variable loses its statistical significance for one of our three dependent variables (openness to the outside world), but the sign for the coefficient does not change. Because we have controls for many of the key features of Lebanese society, particularly sect, as well as multiple controls drawn from previous literature that ostensibly capture transnational connections and experiences, we expect that their inclusion would eliminate the effect of the attack if our findings are an artifact of an unbalanced sample.

Second, we apply a more stringent test to determine if the attack coefficient is attenuated (reduced but not driven out of significance) by the inclusion of controls. We use the KHB method for comparing coefficients between nested nonlinear models (Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2012) to see if the coefficient for the attack's effect on our dependent variables in models with controls is statistically significantly smaller than its effect in models without controls. If the inclusion of relevant controls attenuates the effect of the attack in our models, our findings could plausibly be a result of imbalances between the pre- and postattack samples. Because only attenuations of the effect of the attack would undermine the validity of our findings, we employ one-tailed tests—which are more stringent in this application—for all of our KHB models.

Table 6 displays the results of our KHB tests and shows that the inclusion of controls produces no statistically significant attenuation in the effect of the attack in Mount Lebanon, the primary test of our theory and where we find our most counterintuitive results. For South Lebanon, however, the results show a statistically significant attenuation in two of our three dependent variables—global connection and openness to the world—largely

TABLE 6
KHB Tests for Attenuation

Governorate	Dependent Variable	Attenuation
Mount Lebanon	Global connection	. . .
	Global trade	. . .
	Open to world	. . .
South Lebanon	Global connection	*
	Global trade	. . .
	Open to world	**

Note.—This table presents results of our tests for attenuation in the effect of the Beirut attack on our dependent variables due to the inclusion of relevant controls using the KHB method for comparing regression coefficients between same-sample nested nonlinear models. Reported significance levels are for one-tailed tests, which are more conservative in this case than two-tailed tests. The table shows no statistically significant attenuation in the effect of the attack for any of our dependent variables in Mount Lebanon. For South Lebanon, we find statistically significant attenuations in two of our three dependent variables.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

due to imbalances in the proportion of Shi'a respondents in the pre- and postattack samples there. While this outcome suggests that imbalances are more of a plausible threat to our findings in South Lebanon, it is not clear that they are entirely driving the model results. Controlling for observed imbalances eliminates the statistically significant effect of the attack on our openness to the outside world variable, but it attenuates—but does not eliminate—the effect of the attack on our global connection variable. It has no statistical effect on the global trade variable. Thus, overall, the results for the Mount Lebanon sample show no statistical change with the inclusion of controls, while in the South Lebanon case, results from two of our three dependent variables are sensitive to their inclusion.

In a final test of imbalance, we test the possibility that our results might be driven by a systematic bias toward more or less traditionalist attitudes in the pre- and postattack samples. To assess this possibility, we first searched for survey questions in the Arab Barometer that tapped into traditional or global attitudes without reference to security institutions or explicit mention of local/global identities (we discuss security institutions and local identities more below). We identified three suitable questions. First, because attitudes about gender roles are among the most salient issues dividing liberal and conservative individuals in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g., Alexander and Welzel 2011), we assess attitudes toward gender equality by using a question that asks respondents whether they think women should not work outside the home with a four-item Likert response scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." The second question asks respondents whether social status is an obstacle to marriage, with a four-item response scale ranging from "absolutely not" to "to a great extent." Finally, we include a dummy variable that indicates a respondent is opposed to gambling on principle. For all variables, higher values indicate more ostensibly traditionalist attitudes. We assessed whether responses to these questions vary in the pre- and postattack samples using the same methodology that we used to assess our key dependent variables. Our reasoning is that, if our results are driven by sample imbalances in prior attitudes, then we should observe differences in responses between the pre- and postattack samples as we did for attitudes toward global connection.[30] Analyzing three questions for both governorates yields six comparisons, the results of which are illustrated in figure 7 (see app. D for full model results). We observed no statistically significant difference in responses between the samples, suggesting that the samples do not vary significantly with respect to traditionalist attitudes either as a result of imbalance or as a result of the attack.

[30] We do not include such attitudes as controls in the original analyses since they may change as a result of the attack and are therefore endogenous.



FIG. 7.—Lebanese response to the Beirut bombing: traditionalism/progressivism. The figure shows the mean values for three variables measuring traditionalist attitudes in two governorates of Lebanon before and after the Beirut bombing. Light gray bars indicate pre-attack means, dark gray bars indicate postattack means, and error bars indicate one standard deviation from mean values. There are no statistically significant differences in any of the variables between the pre- and postattack samples. Reported significance levels are from nonlinear regression models with controls and robust SEs (see app. D).

Another possible risk to the validity of our findings is whether the Beirut attack is the "treatment of interest" in this case (Dunning 2007, p. 285). Terrorist attacks undoubtedly increase threat, but other features of these attacks may account for our results and limit their generalizability to other types of threat. In particular, since the advent of the War on Terror, stigmatization of "Arab" and "Muslim" as social categories has increased, largely as a result of the actions and discourses of powerful global actors (Brubaker 2015, p. 46). As such, the observed effect of the attack on desire for proximity with global society among Lebanese may, in fact, be a result of Lebanese fleeing these globally stigmatized collective identities. Moaddel and Latif (2006, p. 39), for example, find that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, respondents in Egypt and Morocco were more likely to express gender-egalitarian attitudes and less likely to endorse implementing *shari'a*—sometimes called Islamic law—as the event caused these populations to "turn away from the ideology of religious extremism and toward Western values." We follow the same approach here by assessing the effect of the attack on three variables measuring attitudes generally argued to be proxies for a strong Muslim identity (e.g., Fish 2011; Gorman 2018). The first addresses how much respon-

dents trust Islamist parties, with a four-item response scale ranging from "absolutely not" to "to a great extent." The second measures respondents' support for strict implementation of *shari'a* law, with a four-item response scale ranging from strong disapproval to strong support. The third asks whether respondents believe women should be required to wear a hijab, with a four-item Likert response scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." We recoded all variables so that higher response values indicate greater adherence to so-called "Islamic values."

Analyzing these three questions in both governorates yields six comparisons. Figure 8 displays the results of mean comparisons for these alternative dependent variables (see app. E for full model results). The results indicate a statistically null relationship between the attack and all three variables in Mount Lebanon, suggesting that the observed increases in desire for proximity for global society there are not reducible to a denigration of local identities. In South Lebanon, however, we find a positive effect of the attack on all



FIG. 8.—Lebanese response to the Beirut bombing: changes in local identities and associated values. The figure shows the mean ratings of support for strict implementation of *shari'a* law, trust in Islamist organizations, and support for restricting women's dress in two governorates of Lebanon before and after the Beirut bombing. Light gray bars indicate preattack means, dark gray bars indicate postattack means, and error bars indicate one standard deviation from mean values. In Mount Lebanon, the pre-/postattack difference was null for all three variables in ordinal logistic regression models, suggesting that the attack did little to denigrate local identities. In South Lebanon, by contrast, responses to all three variables were statistically significantly higher after the attack. Reported significance levels are from ordinal logistic regression models with controls and robust SEs (see app. E): $*P < .05$, $**P < .01$, $***P < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

of these variables. The latter finding suggests an emphasis on local, particularistic identities as a result of the attack and is consistent with hypothesis 4: residents of South Lebanon turn to local identities in the wake of the attack because they do not consider global actors potential allies.

To summarize, the effect of the attack in Lebanon appears broadly consistent with our expectations and inconsistent with the most plausible alternative explanations. For Mount Lebanon, we showed that the effect of the attack on attitudes toward global connection did not diminish for any of our key independent variables when conditioned on a number of controls. Moreover, we assessed whether the pre- and postattack samples differed on eight other attitudinal questions regarding traditional values, local security institutions, and local identities, and we found no significant differences in any of these questions. For South Lebanon, by contrast, we found a negative relationship between the attack and a desire for proximity with global society for two of our three measures, although the inclusion of controls attenuates the effect of the attack to the point of statistical insignificance for one of these. We found that trust in local security institutions and expressions of local identities increased,[31] but we found no differences between the pre- and postattack South Lebanon samples in traditional attitudes. Thus, the residents of South Lebanon appear to have behaved similarly to residents of strong countries by embracing local security institutions and identities in the face of threat.

THREAT AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION

Theoretical work on global identification, which tends to focus on the individuals most embedded in global social, economic, and institutional networks, has conflicted with empirical research, which suggests that people on the global periphery tend to identify as world citizens at rates similar to or higher than those of people in the global core. We argued that in addition to connection, threat can lead to global identification when people cannot find security in local, particularistic identities. We presented three empirical findings in support of this argument. First, in weak and repressive states that lack the capacity and/or willingness to provide adequate security to their populations, residents are more likely to identify as world citizens. Second, members of social collectivities that experience malign neglect or active marginalization from domestic states are more likely to identify as world citizens

[31] Supplemental KHB analyses show that the observed effect of the attack on the variable for perceptions of police performance is statistically significantly attenuated by the inclusion of controls in South Lebanon.

than conationals with access to state-provided security. Third, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, residents of Mount Lebanon, a region of a weak state with a history of relatively consensual interactions with the international community, expressed more positive attitudes about global connection. In contrast, residents of South Lebanon, where much of the population may view the international community itself as an existential threat, exhibited the opposite pattern: less identification with global society and more identification with local identities and security institutions.

We developed our argument by synthesizing recent work in social psychology and political science that suggests that the effect of threat on collective identification is conditional on the perceived strength of the in-groups to which one belongs. We build on this scholarship by showing that members of groups that cannot find a sense of security in particularistic identities will expand their in-group definitions in the face of threat. This perspective finds some support in recent scholarship, but we generally think that researchers should further investigate when and why the relative position of social collectivities modifies the effect of threat on collective identification and on political attitudes more generally. While most scholarship on group threat tends to focus on the reactions of securely positioned and dominant groups, we encourage future researchers to examine how members of more precariously positioned groups experience and respond to threat (see, e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Abascal 2015).

Here we have shown the utility of recognizing group threat as a mechanism driving the construction of global identities. However, we caution against interpreting our results as demonstrating that connection and cooperation are inconsequential for identification with world society. The pervasiveness of global connections makes global identification conceivable in the first place, and the fact that many marginal groups have successfully appealed to global institutions to vouchsafe their security has made the global order an attractive basis for constructing identities (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, we do argue that the focus on cooperation and connection in much of the literature in the world polity and related traditions has obfuscated the strong role that threat, power, and violence play in constructing and maintaining identification with the global order. Indeed, the very institutions that foster global cooperation originated in response to threats and breakdowns in the global order: the League of Nations at the end of World War I, the United Nations and the European Coal and Steel Community at the end of World War II, and the Non-Aligned Movement in response to Cold War threats of proxy wars and nuclear annihilation (Hilderbrand 2001; Kullaa 2012). Future studies should directly investigate the effects of international efforts to increase local security on identity formation.

However, international organizations are not always the primary agentic actors influencing the construction and diffusion of global identities. Given

that these organizations are dominated by states in the global core, much of the literature on the spread of so-called "global culture" tends to focus on the diffusion of cultural features of Western states and societies. By contrast, local features of societies on the global periphery (e.g., low household television ownership rates, political instability, intergroup conflict) are often regarded as barriers to a process of cultural homogenization led by Western actors; thus, in most instances, peripheral populations are depicted as either submitting to or resisting this process (cf. Paschel 2010). Our results cast doubt on the dominant understanding of core-to-periphery cultural diffusion by showing that residents of the global periphery identify as world citizens because of, not in spite of, local conditions. The fact that global identities can emerge from local conditions rather than being carried by international organizations also helps to explain the puzzling decoupling of global identities and "global" values (e.g., Pichler 2011). The current study represents a step toward meaningfully integrating the global periphery into theories of global cultural diffusion, and we suggest that future research investigate how people on the global periphery work to produce, appropriate, and reconfigure global norms and identities.

Our analyses show that the link between group threat and global identification holds net of national identification, but the relationship between national and global identification remains unclear. Future research might investigate whether and how national and global identities compete with, supplement, or enhance one another. We suspect that the relationship between national and global identities is strongly dependent on both an individual's position in local sociopolitical hierarchies and his or her nation-state's position in global power politics. One hypothesis is that national and global identities compete in a zero-sum manner only in powerful core countries but coexist in relative harmony in countries that rely on external actors to guarantee security and stability. Another hypothesis is that tension between global and national identification may follow shifts in global income distribution over the past few decades, with members of working class ethnic majorities in advanced industrialized economies among the most likely to see the two as in conflict (Lakner and Milanovic 2016).

Finally, because shared identity entails a desire for proximity, our results shed light on the question of how durable our interconnected world really is. Some have argued that continuing violence, especially in weak states, undermines global solidarity and threatens to fracture the global order (e.g., Huntington 1997; Juergensmeyer 2008). Contrary to these arguments, we find that exposure to violence tends to encourage a more global conception of citizenship among residents of weak and repressive states—except when groups do not perceive global actors as a potential source of security. When juxtaposed with the large body of evidence showing that residents of strong states emphasize particularistic identities that encourage isolationist and

xenophobic tendencies in response to acute threats (e.g., Feinstein 2016*a*), this presents an ironic dilemma: the reactions of residents of the same core states that largely constructed and continue to dominate the global order compose the greatest risk to its preservation. This circumstance suggests that individuals on the global periphery are less of a danger to the global order than residents of the global core; the latter are more likely to retreat to particularism under threat and have the power to alter their countries' foreign policies and relationships with the outside world (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Consider, for example, that residents of the United Kingdom, one of the world's most powerful countries, recently voted to leave the European Union, while residents of less powerful countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia remain eager to join. Thus, the autonomy of policy makers in powerful core states vis-à-vis their citizens in foreign affairs is likely key to the continuance of the global order.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
List of Social Groups and Social Position by Country (ISSP)

Country	Group	Status
Croatia	Croats	Included
	Serbs	Marginalized
Czech Republic	Czechs	Included
	Roma	Marginalized
	Slovaks	Included
Estonia	Estonians	Included
	Russians	Marginalized
France	Corsicans	Neglected
	French	Included
	Muslims	Marginalized
Georgia	Georgians	Included
	Russians	Included
Germany	Germans	Included
	Turks	Marginalized
United Kingdom	Afro-Caribbeans	Marginalized
	Asians	Marginalized
	English	Included
	Scots	Included
Hungary	Hungarians	Included
	Roma	Marginalized
India	Assamese (non-SC/ST/OBCs)	Neglected
	Hindi (non-SC/ST)	Included
	Kashmiris	Marginalized
	Mizos	Included
	Muslims	Marginalized
	Naga	Neglected
	SC/ST	Neglected
	Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)	Included

TABLE A1 (*Continued*)

Country	Group	Status
Israel	Jews	Included
	Palestinians	Marginalized
Latvia	Latvians	Included
	Russians	Marginalized
Lithuania	Lithuanians	Included
	Poles	Neglected
	Russians	Included
Mexico	Indigenous peoples	Marginalized
	Mestizos	Included
Philippines	Christian lowlanders	Included
	Igorots	Neglected
	Moros	Neglected
Russia	Buryats	Neglected
	Chechens	Marginalized
	Russians	Included
	Tatars	Marginalized
	Yakuts	Neglected
Slovak Republic	Hungarians	Neglected
	Roma	Neglected
	Slovaks	Included
South Africa	Asians	Neglected
	Coloreds	Neglected
	Whites	Included
	Xhosa	Neglected
	Zulus	Neglected
Spain	Basques	Included
	Catalans	Included
	Roma	Marginalized
	Spanish	Included
Turkey	Kurds	Marginalized
	Turkish	Included
United States	African-Americans	Neglected
	Latinos	Neglected
	Non-Hispanic whites	Included

NOTE.—SC/ST = scheduled castes and tribes; OBC = other backward classes.

APPENDIX B

TABLE B1
List of Social Groups and Social Position by Country (WVS)

Country	Group	Status
Algeria	Arabs	Included
	Berbers	Neglected
Argentina	Indigenous peoples	Marginalized
	Jews	Neglected
	Whites/mestizos	Included
Australia	Aborigines	Neglected
	Whites	Included
Azerbaijan	Armenians	Included
	Azeri	Included
Belarus	Byelorussians	Included
	Poles	Marginalized
	Russians	Included
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	Marginalized
	Indigenous peoples	Marginalized
	Whites	Included
Bulgaria	Bulgarians	Included
	Roma	Neglected
	Turks	Marginalized
Canada	English speakers	Included
	French speakers (non-Quebecois)	Neglected
	Quebecois	Included
China	Han Chinese	Included
	Muslims	Marginalized
Colombia	Afro-Colombians	Marginalized
	Indigenous peoples	Marginalized
	Whites/mestizos	Included
Cyprus	Greeks	Included
	Turks	Included
Ecuador	Afro-Ecuadorians	Marginalized
	Indigenous highland peoples	Marginalized
	Indigenous lowland peoples	Marginalized
	Whites/mestizos	Included
Egypt	Arab Muslims	Included
	Copts	Marginalized
Estonia	Estonians	Included
	Russians	Marginalized
Ethiopia	Afars	Neglected
	Amhara	Included
	Harari	Included
	Oroma	Marginalized
	Somalis	Neglected
	Tigreans	Included
Georgia	Adzhars	Included
	Armenians	Included
	Georgians	Included
	Russians	Included
Germany	Germans	Included
	Turks	Marginalized
Ghana	Akans	Included

TABLE B1 (*Continued*)

Country	Group	Status
	Ewe	Included
	Northern groups	Neglected
Hungary	Hungarians	Included
	Roma	Marginalized
India	Assamese (non-SC/ST/OBCs)	Neglected
	Hindi (non-SC/ST)	Included
	OBC	Marginalized
	Tripuras	Marginalized
	SC/ST	Neglected
	Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)	Included
	Muslims	Marginalized
	Kashmiris	Marginalized
Indonesia	Han Chinese	Marginalized
	Javanese	Included
Italy	Italians	Included
	Sardinians	Neglected
Jordan	Jordanian Arabs	Included
	Palestinians	Marginalized
Kazakhstan	Germans	Marginalized
	Kazakhs	Included
	Russians	Marginalized
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz	Included
	Russians	Marginalized
	Uzbeks	Marginalized
Malaysia	Chinese	Marginalized
	Dayaks	Neglected
	East Indians	Neglected
	Kadazans	Neglected
	Malays	Included
Mali	Blacks	Included
	Tuareg	Neglected
Mexico	Mestizos	Included
	Indigenous peoples	Marginalized
Moldova	Slavs	Included
	Gagauz	Included
	Moldovans	Included
Morocco	Arabs	Included
	Berbers	Neglected
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani	Included
	Igbo	Included
	Yoruba	Included
	Ijaw	Marginalized
Pakistan	Baluchis	Neglected
	Hindus	Marginalized
	Mohajirs	Included
	Pashtuns	Marginalized
	Punjabis	Included
	Sindhis	Marginalized
Peru	Afro-Peruvians	Marginalized
	Whites/mestizos	Included
Philippines	Christian lowlanders	Included
	Moros	Neglected

TABLE B1 (*Continued*)

Country	Group	Status
Romania	Hungarians	Marginalized
	Roma	Marginalized
	Romanians	Included
Russia	Russians	Included
	Tatars	Marginalized
South Africa	Whites	Included
	Asians	Neglected
	Coloreds	Neglected
	Xhosa	Neglected
	Zulus	Neglected
Thailand	Chinese	Included
	Northern hill tribes	Neglected
	Malay-Muslims	Neglected
	Thai	Included
Turkey	Kurds	Marginalized
	Turks	Included
Ukraine	Russians	Marginalized
	Ukrainians	Included
United States	African-Americans	Neglected
	Latinos	Neglected
	Non-Hispanic whites	Included
Uzbekistan	Russians	Marginalized
	Tajiks	Marginalized
	Uzbeks	Included
Zambia	Bemba	Included
	Lozi	Neglected
	Nyanja speakers	Included
	Tonga-Ila-Lenje	Included
Zimbabwe	Ndebele	Neglected
	Shona	Included

NOTE.—SC/ST = scheduled castes and tribes; OBC = other backward classes.

APPENDIX C

TABLE C1
Ordinal Logistic Regressions on Attitudes Toward Domestic Security Institutions

	Government Performance		Police Performance	
	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon
Beirut attack	.82	46.91***	1.58	4.10**
	(.21)	(27.85)	(.40)	(2.25)
Urban elite	1.48	1.97	1.02	2.50*
	(.33)	(.87)	(.20)	(1.14)
Multilingual	.96	1.51	.77	1.20
	(.28)	(1.37)	(.20)	(.74)
Visited West	1.20	2.48	1.06	1.79
	(.29)	(1.95)	(.25)	(1.20)
Owns computer	1.17	2.69	.93	.50
	(.32)	(2.50)	(.24)	(.35)
Female	.93	1.45	1.27	1.11
	(.20)	(.61)	(.23)	(.44)
Age	1.21*	1.08	.95	.80
	(.10)	(.26)	(.07)	(.16)
Shi'a	1.62	1.16	1.04	3.06*
	(.43)	(.64)	(.18)	(1.42)
Sunni	.41		1.39	
	(.23)		(.67)	
Observations	387	110	387	110
Pre/post	69/318	50/60	69/318	50/60

Note.—All models employ robust SEs. In Mount Lebanon, Christian is the excluded baseline sectarian category. In South Lebanon, Sunni is the excluded baseline sectarian category. Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

APPENDIX D

TABLE D1
Nonlinear Regressions on Traditionalism/Progressivism

	Women Should Not Work		Marriage Objection: Social Status		No Gambling on Principle	
	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon
Beirut attack	.80	1.63	.77	.88	.54	.49
	(.25)	(.86)	(.20)	(.45)	(.19)	(.34)
Urban elite	.90	2.39	.64*	1.34	1.30	.88
	(.23)	(1.11)	(.13)	(.64)	(.39)	(.49)
Multilingual	.88	1.44	.87	1.57	.65	1.33
	(.30)	(.95)	(.27)	(.73)	(.24)	(.83)
Visited West	.56	.64	1.18	.78	1.02	1.13
	(.19)	(.48)	(.27)	(.62)	(.34)	(.94)
Owns computer	1.84	.49	1.08	1.03	1.14	1.32
	(.61)	(.33)	(.27)	(.57)	(.39)	(1.23)
Female	.42***	.45	1.21	1.55	1.46	1.32
	(.10)	(.21)	(.23)	(.66)	(.42)	(.70)
Age	1.15	1.17	1.14	1.00	1.01	1.29
	(.10)	(.26)	(.08)	(.20)	(.11)	(.37)
Shi'a	4.88***	.45	.53**	.44	1.28	.15***
	(1.32)	(.24)	(.11)	(.20)	(.49)	(.08)
Sunni	1.92		.13***		3.66**	
	(.90)		(.07)		(1.78)	
Observations	384	109	386	108	380	106
Pre/post	69/315	50/59	69/317	50/58	68/312	49/57

Note.—We employ ordinal logistic regression models for the variables *women should not work* and *marriage objection: social status* and logistic regression models for the variable *no gambling on principle* because it is binary. All models employ robust SEs. In Mount Lebanon, Christian is the excluded baseline sectarian category. In South Lebanon, Sunni is the excluded baseline sectarian category. Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

APPENDIX E

TABLE E1
Ordinal Logistic Regressions on Local Identities

	Support Strict *Shari'a*		Trust Islamists		Hijab Required	
	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon
Beirut attack	.82	6.87***	1.24	4.75**	.71	11.86***
	(.20)	(3.30)	(.53)	(2.51)	(.23)	(5.91)
Urban elite	1.80**	5.00**	.95	.48	1.36	3.19
	(.41)	(2.68)	(.26)	(.20)	(.35)	(1.50)
Multilingual	.68	1.81	1.36	.54	.53*	4.05*
	(.20)	(1.08)	(.45)	(.28)	(.17)	(2.47)
Visited West	.84	2.43	.91	2.94	1.98*	.62
	(.21)	(1.92)	(.30)	(1.83)	(.61)	(.45)
Owns computer	1.25	.38	1.02	4.28*	.90	.60
	(.36)	(.30)	(.36)	(2.53)	(.28)	(.34)
Female	1.53*	1.92	.75	2.89*	.78	1.41
	(.31)	(.78)	(.19)	(1.22)	(.18)	(.54)
Age	1.10	.84	1.14	.88	.94	1.22
	(.09)	(.17)	(.13)	(.17)	(.08)	(.25)
Shi'a	2.17***	.45	16.63***	9.61***	3.44***	1.37
	(.51)	(.18)	(5.35)	(5.78)	(.87)	(.60)
Sunni	4.87**		.69		.41	
	(2.47)		(.48)		(.25)	
Observations	378	109	379	110	374	110
Pre/post	67/311	50/59	66/313	50/60	68/306	50/60

Note.—All models employ robust SEs. In Mount Lebanon, Christian is the excluded baseline sectarian category. In South Lebanon, Sunni is the excluded baseline sectarian category. Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

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